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lEGENT CAsEs
By disallowing the testimony of the officer, Kentucky follows the
nearly umversal rule based on the common sense belief that statements
made as much as six hours after the act almost always lack spontaneity
in the sense of arising from and being prompted by the act. By
allowing the testimony of the employer, Kentucky follows the current
trend of decisions in this limited type of res gestae situation. This is
the first time the Kentucky court has been confronted with so close
a situation.13 It may be argued that Kentucky has extended the
doctrine too far, but when a trial court is satisfied, as it was in the
principal case, that the evidence of spontaneity is sufficient under the
circumstances, ordinarily its exercise of discretion should not be
disturbed.14
Terrence R. Fitzgerald
TORTS-PAxENTAL LLmmrrY FOR Tm INTENTIoNAL TORT OF MiNoR
Camr-Plamtiff brought action for damages against parents of minor
children who had allegedly committed assault and battery De-
fendants sons allegedly pursued plaintiff in an automobile, forced him
to stop, dragged hin from his automobile and injured him to the
extent that he was hospitalized. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants
knew their sons had dangerous tendencies of a malicious nature;
that by lack of parental discipline they failed to prevent their sons
from beating others; and that because of this negligence plaintiff was
injured. One defendant imposed a demurrer, which was sustained.
The plaintiff appealed. Held: Reversed and remanded. A cause of
action is stated by alleging that defendants knew their sons had
inflicted injuries on other boys, and that defendants were negligent in
failing to exercise parental authority over their sons, thus making
plaintiffs injuries possible. Bieker v. Owens, 350 S.W.2d 522 (Ark.
1961).
The common law rule is that a parent is not liable for the torts
of his minor child.' Three exceptions are made to this rule: (1) when
the parent employs the child and the child commits a tort in the
course of employment, (2) when the parent participates in the
13 Res gestae in sex crimes is a limited field. The closest Kentucky cases on
this point are Hopper v. Commonwealth, 311 Ky. 655, 225 S.W.2d 100 (1949)
(statements made several days after the event held inadmissible) and Cornwell v.
Commonwealth, 291 S.W.2d 563 (Ky. 1956) (utterances made a few minutes
after the act held admissible).
'4 In State v. Finley, 85 Arz. 327, 338 P.2d 790, 794 (1959), the court said
that "each case must depend upon its own facts and much must be left to the
sound discretion of the trial court."
1Prosser, Torts §101 (2d ed. 1955).
KENTUcKY LAW jOuNAL[
child's act by ratifying or consenting to it and (3) when the parent's
negligence in failing to control the child makes the in]ury possible.'
in the Bieker case, the court applied this last exception.
Conversely, the civil law rule is that a parent is liable for the torts
of his minor child.3 Two exceptions are made to this rule: (1) a
parent is not liable if he was unable to prevent the minor s act and
(2) a parent is not liable if the child was not legally responsible
because of his age.4
Many states, apparently dissatisfied with the common law rule,
have enacted statutes which provide that a parent will be liable for
damage inflicted by his child, regardless of parental fault. Usually
these statutes limit liability to a fixed amount for intentional damage
to property,5 although a few allow recovery for intentional injury to
persons. 6 This legislation represents a trend toward the civil law
approach. Absent this statutory liability, however, the common law
rule with its three exceptions is the prevailing view.
Kentucky follows the common law rule with its three exceptions,
but further limits the liability of a parent whose negligence in failing
to control his child makes an injury possible. In Haunert v. Spezere
the defendants son, a minor, assaulted the plaintiff. The plaintiff
alleged that defendants knew their son had previously engaged in
this type of conduct. The court held that the plaintiff failed to state
a cause of action because he did not allege that defendants son had
insufficient discretion to appreciate the consequences of his act.
Contrary to the civil law rule with its exceptions, this holding
2 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child §66 (1950); 39 Am. Jur. Parent and Child §55
(1942).
3 Stone, Liability for Damage Caused by Minors, A Comparative Study, 5
Ala. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1952).4 Loumsiana patterned its code after the civil law, but failed to include the
two exceptions. La. Civ. Code art. 2318 (West's Supp. 1961) provides that the
father is responsible for damage occasioned by his minor children. The second
exception was added by the case of Johnson v. Butterworth, 180 La. 586, 157 So.
121 (1934), so that now a parent is liable for damage inflicted by his minor
children regardless of whether he was able to prevent it, but is not liable where
the child himself is relieved by law.
5 Cal. Civ. Code §1714.1 (1960); Fla. Rev. Stat. §45.20 (1953); Idaho Code
Ann. §6-210 (Supp. 1961); Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.1408 (1)-(2) (Supp. 1959);
Mont. Rev. Code §61-112.1 (1961); Nev. Rev. Stat. §43-301 (1957); N.M. Stat.
Ann. §22-21-1 (Supp. 1961); Okla. Stat. tit. 23, §10 (Supp. 1962); Tenn. Code
Ann. §§37.1001, 37.1003 (Supp. 1962); Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 5923-1 (1962); WVa.
Code §5482 (2)-(3) (1961); Wis. Stat. Ann. §331.035 (1958).6 Aiz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §12-661 (Wests Supp. 1961); La. Civ. Code art.
2318 (West's Supp. 1961); and R.I. Gen. Laws §9-1-3 (1956). Typical of these
is Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §12-661 (West's Supp. 1961), which provides that any
act of malicious or willful rmsconduct of a minor which results in any injury to the
person or property of another shall be imputed to the parents having custody or
control of the minor for all purposes of civil damage.
7214 Ky. 46, 281 S.W 998 (1926).
[Vol. 51,
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imposes liability upon a parent for damages occasioned by his child
when the child is too young to be competent, but departs from
liability as soon as the child reaches the age of competancy It is
unfortunate that Kentucky denies recovery against a parent simply
because his child is legally competent. Where the parent is negligent
in controlling his child, should not he also be responsible?
The principal case is significant because it is one of the few times
when a wronged party has sued on the theory of negligence of the
parent. The main reason for this dearth of decisions is that wronged
parties experience difficulty in establishing a prima facie case of
negligence sufficient to present the issue of parental liability to the
jury The plaintiff must show (1) the parent knew or should have
known of the child's propensity to harm others, and (2) the parent
failed to exercise ordinary care in controlling the child.8 This places
an unreasonable burden on the plaintiff for these facts lie pre-
dominantly within the knowledge of the defendant. During childhood
a parent's supervision, or lack of it, is always partly responsible for
the child's behavior. This responsibility alone is not enough on which
to predicate liability, for liability is dependent upon a specific act of
negligence at a particular time. But this responsibility should be
enough to reduce the plaintiff's burden of establishing a prima facie
case. Since the defendant is in a better position to know the facts,
why not shift the burden of going forward with the evidence to him?
This could be accomplished by drawing an analogy to the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine. This would closely resemble the civil law rule which
holds the parent of a competent child liable unless he shows that he
could not have prevented the injury, but would not be as harsh.
Joe C. Savage
8 What knowledge is reqired to ut a parent on notice that his child is
likely to harm others? It has been held that knowledge must be of some sub-
stantial misbehavior or propensity for misbehavior. Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So.2d
701 (Fla. 1955). It has also been held that knowledge of acts of misbehavior or
a bad disposition are insufficient. Capps v. Carpenter, 129 Kan. 462, 283 Pac. 655
(1930). What is the difference between a bad disposition and a propensity to
misbehave?
Where a parent knows that his child may inflict damage, how may this child
be controlled? When does a child become incorrigible? A recent Califorma case
held that a parent may have a duty to warn those coming in contact with an
incomgible child. Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953).
This is a practical solution where the child bites the baby-sitter, but where the
child is old enough to drive an automobile and injuries someone miles away, the
practicality is removed.
These close questions can seldom be solved as a matter of law, but are
rightfully questions for the jury. As in all questions of negligence, the test is
whether the parent exercised reasonable care under the circumstances.
1962]
